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RECENT CASES.
APPEAL AND ERRoR-DIsMISSAL-COSTS.-STATE EX EEL TAYLOR V. VANN,
37,S. E. 263 (N. C.).-Held, where, pending appeal from a judgment in favor
of plaintiff in an action to recover an office, the term of office expired, render-
ing futile any further judgment, the appellate court will not determine the
merits of the case merely to decide the costs of appeal, and will dismiss the
appeal but will not dismiss the action.
The dismissal of the appeal is in accord with Herting v. Pugh, 125 N. C.
437, 34 S. E. 538, and Commissioners v. Gill, 126 N. C. 86, 35 S. E. 228, which
declare that the Court will not determine the merits of a case simply to decide
who must bear the costs. But the Court goes further and refuses to dismiss
the action on the ground that the plaintiff had a just and lawful cause of
action under the doctrine of Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. 1, 15 N. C. 1, which
holds an office to be private property. This is opposed to the doctrine of Tay-
lor v. Beckham, 178 U. S. 576, 20 Sup. Ct. 900, 44 L. Ed., and of practically
all the other States, which hold that office is an agency or trust.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SPEcIAL LEGISLATION-TREATMENT OF INEERIATES.
-MURRY V. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF RAMSEY COUNTY, 84 N. W. 103
(Minn.).-An act provided that each county of 50,000 or more inhabitants
should provide and maintain a private institution in which inebriates might be
treated, reformed and cured. Commitment therein was by personal applica-
tion, or that of some friend or kin, and the number was limited to one from
each 10,000 of the county. Held, unconstitutional.
A similar act applying to the whole State was held invalid because it at-
tempted to give more than constitutional powers to probate judges. Foreman
v. Commissioners, 67 N. W. 207. The statute under consideration was de-
signed to meet this objection, but it was held unconstitutional as being class
legislation, for sectional acts, to be valid, must rest on somepeculiarity plainly
distinguishing the places included from those excluded. The Court held that
the assumed difference between urban and rural drunkenness was not such a
distinguishing characteristic. State v. Cooley, 58 N. W. 150; State v. Rift,
79 N. W. 535. The statute at bar occasioned a great deal of adverse press
comment through the West, and was popularly dubbed "The Minnesota
jag law."
CONTRACTS-AGREEMENT TO RE-DELIVER NOTE- ACTION FOR BREACH.-
LYLE V. MCCORMICK HARVESTING MACHINE Co., 84 N. W. 18 (Wis.).-Plain-
tiff, the maker of a note, gave the same to defendant, the payee, under an
agreement that it was to be returned on the happening of a certain contin-
gency. Before the event specified, the defendant transferred the note to a third
party, who was unable to collect it on execution, as plaintiff had meanwhile
become insolvent. Nevertheless, held, that the defendant was liable for
conversion.
An interesting and somewhat novel defense was set up, riz: that the con-
tract was in the nature of an indemnity and that therefore the defendant was
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not liable until damage had been suffered by the compulsory payment of the
note or execution thereon; however, the Court held that the breach of con-
tract was complete and awarded as damages the full amount of the note.
Kohler v. Matiage, 72 N. Y. 259; Redfield v. Haight, 27 Conn. 31. Mere
insolvency of the maker does not necessarily render a note valueless. It was
objected that the plaintiff might collect the judgment from the defendant and
then not pay the note; but the Court said this danger might be averted by
equitable counter-claim and cited with approval Loosemore v. Radford, 9 M.
& W. 659, and Johnson v. Britton, 23 Ind. 105.
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-COMPETENCY OF DIVORCED WIFE TO TESTIFY
AGAINST HUsBAND.-STATE v. KODAT, 59 S. W. 73 (Mo.).--The defendant was
indicted for a criminal assault upon a third person. Between the time of the
assault and the trial the defendant's wife had obtained a divorce. At the trial
the divorced wife testified against the defendant. Held, that such evidence
was incompetent.
This decision seems at variance with the prevailing tendency of modern
decisions. At common law, a husband or wife could not, with few exceptions,
testify against the other in any legal proceedings. This being the case, the sev-
erance of the marriage relation would not remove the disqualification, and it
was upon this ground that the decision was based. State v. Raby, 28 S. B.
490 (N. C.); State v. Phelps, 2 Fyler 374. The disqualification, however, now
is generally restricted to confidential communications. The important consid-
eration is the public convenience of getting at the truth in all cases. Appeal of
Robb, 98 Ila. St. 501; Westerman v. Westerman, 25 Ohio St. 500; Shouler,
Husband and Wi e, 85.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONDITIONS AND TERMS OF A WRITTEN INSTRU-
MENT-PAROL EVIDENCE AS TO BACH.-GALE MFG. CO. V. FINKELSTEIN, 59 S.
W. 571 (Tex.).-The defendant gave the plaintiffs agent an unambiguous
order for goods, in writing. Defendant offered evidence of a parol contempo-
raneous agreement, that the order should be sent by the agent to the plaintiff,
and if not accepted and the defendant notified within thirty days, it was to be
considered cancelled. The trial court admitted the parol evidence, over the de-
fendant's objection, but the appellate court held, it was error to admit it as
varying the terms of a writing by parol.
The appellate court fails to consider the distinction between the conditions
and the terms of a written instrument. The condition on which an instrument
is to become binding may always be shown by parol. In McFarland v. Sikes,
7 At]. 408, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held parol evidence admissible
to show that the condition of a promissory note was that defendant should
appear before a grand juror on a certain day. The note was absolute on its
face. The Court held that the defendant's appearanee was not a term of the
contract, but a condition. So here, the ratification and notice to defendant
was a condition, the perfornance of which gave the contract life, the non-
performance of which in thirty days rendered it a nullity. This rule and the
distinction is recognized in Benton v. Martin, 52 N. Y. 570; Watson v. Bowers,
119 Mass. 383; Sweet v. Stevens, 1 R. I. 375; Schindler v. Mulheiser, 45 Ct.
153; Westman v. Krinnweide, 15 N. W. 255; and others.
DIVORCE-ALIMON--FOREIGN JUDGMENTs-REs JUDICATA.-ARRINGTON V.
ARRINGTON, 37 S. E. 212 (N. C.).-Held, under Federal Constitution (Art. 4,
Sec. 1), declaring that full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the
judicial proceedings of other States, a judgment for divorce, granting alimony,
is resjudicata and binding on the parties, and, when sued on, defendant cannot
plead to the merits in the original action.
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That alimony in a lump sum or past due is such matter of record as to
come under this article of the Constitution is well established. It is stated
that alimony, future as well as past, is such a matter of record, in Barber v.
Barber, 21 How. 582, 16 L. Ed. 226, but, contra, Lynde v. Lynde, 162 N. Y.
405, 56 N. E. 979, 48 L. R. A. 679, holds that a decree for payment of alimony
in the future lacks the conclusiveness to bring it under the Federal Constitution.
ELECTIONS-CITIZENSHIP-TREATY WITH SPAIN-CITIZEN OF PORTO Rico-
REMOVAL TO UNITED STATES--RIGHT TO VOTE.-PEOPLE EX REL JUARBE V.
BOARD OF INSPECTORS OF TWENTY-FOURTH ELECTION DISTRICT OF TWENTY-
FIFTH ASSEMBLY DISTRICT OF BOROUGH OF MANHATTAN, 67 N.Y. Supp. 236.
-The laws of New York require that a person, in order to be entitled to vote
at a State election, must be a male citizen of the United States. TheConstitu-
tion of the United States (Art. 14, Sec. 1) declares that all persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States. The treaty of peace with Spain (Art. 9) provides
that the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the terri-
tory ceded by Spain to the United States shall be determined by Congress.
Held, that relator, who was a native-born citizen of Porto Rico, and resided
theri until September, 1899, when he moved to the United States, and who had
never been naturalized, was not a citizen of the United States within the mean-
ing of the Federal Constitution, and hence not entitled to register as a voter.
Juarbe had renounced allegiance to Spain and "adopted the nationality of
the United States," serving with the army of occupation in Porto Rico during
the Spanish war. But he must also show that the United States adopted him
as a full-fledged citizen, and this could only be, in this case, by a collective nat-
uralization of the Porto Ricans. The right claimed by the relator depends
upon express proof that the right of full citizenship was conferred, and it can-
not be upheld on the broad claim that the Constitution follows the flag, or
that in the United States there can be no subjects. The trial judge notes a dif-
ference between the case where life, liberty or property is sought to be taken
away without due process of law, as required by the fundamental law of the
land, and the case in bar, which rests merely upon a claim of privilege-which
privilege has not been conferred as yet, as Congress has not acted.
INDICTMENT FOR PERJURY BY WHICH JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL WAS SE-
CURED-REs ADJUDICATA-ANALOGY TO JUDGMENT SECURED BY FRAUD-COOPER
V. COMMONWEALTH, 59 S. W. 574. For majority opinion, 51 S. W. 789 (Ky.).
Cooper was acquitted of a charge of adultery. Held, that thejudgment on the
case was conclusive in his favor on a subsequent charge of perjury, alleging
that he falsely and knowingly did swear that he had not carnal knowledge
of the woman.
The decision is on the ground that the same facts were in issue between the
same parties and the first judgment disposed of them. While the jury must
have believed that he committed adultery to convict, yet the questions are not
the same. The question in the latter case was, did he commit perjury, and the
evidence was overwhelming that he did. While the judgment in the former
case is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for adultery, it ought not to be for
perjury. The second jury had evidence the first did not have, and should have
been allowed to weigh it. No pretense is made that if the first judgment had
been procured by fraud it would have been a bar. 5 GreenL. E., Sec. 38; 1
Whart. Cr. Law, Sec. 546; 1 Chitty Cr. Law, 657. Why should it be when
secured by a means infinitely more vicious; a means which aims a blow at the
security of all justice. The authorities cited to support this decision are cases
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where the facts were the same, but here was the additional fact that he had
lied, abundantly proved, so that no violence need be done the doctrine of
starc decisis.
LIFE INSURANCE-DEFENSE OF SUICIDE.-KNIGHTS TEmPLARS' AND MASONS'
LIFE INDEMNITY CO. V. JARMAN, 104 Fed. 638.-A statute made suicide no de-
fence to an insurance policy. Held, that suicide was used in its popular sense
as comprehending all cases where the insured took his own life. whether while
sane or insane. Sanborn, circuit judge, dissenting.
There is a long line of authorities that support the dissentingjudge. Man-
hattan Life Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U. S. 121, is representative of that
view, and it would seem that it is not entirely incorrect to apply a metaphysi-
cal solution to problems like the present. Technically, suicide certainly implies
an element of volition. See Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 34 Mich. 45.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-WHAT PREVENTS BAR OF STATUTE.-PHOENIx
LUMBER Co. v. HOUSTON WATER CO.. 59 S. W. 552 (Tex.).-Plaintiff com-
menced his suit on a contract, within prescribed time. Afterward he amended
his complaint, making it an action in tort, claiming that the same facts would
sustain either action. Held, complaint setting up tort not having been filed
within six years was barred.
Bingham v. Talbot, 63 Tex. 273; Salt Co. v. Heide, 80 Tex. 349; McLane
v. Belvin, 47 Tex. 502; and many other Texas cases are cited in support of the
decision, but it is contrary to the purpose of the Statute of Limitations, which
is to take away a remedy from those who do nothing toward the assertion of
their rights within the prescribed time, and not to overreach by a mere techni-
cality a man who commences to prosecute his suit but makes a mistake as to
the proper form of action. In Premo v. Lee, 56 Vt. 60, plaintiff sued in his
own name before the expiration of the statute, and this suit, it was held, re-
moved the bar as to a suit subsequently brought in his name as assignee,
which was the proper form.
MASTER AND SERVANT-DEFECTIVE APPLIANCES-QUESTION FOR JURY.-
GREAT NORTHERN RY. Co. v. KASISCHKE, 104 Fed. 440.-A railroad coal
shed had chutes that tripped automatically and let the coal into the tender.
On a certain occasion one of these chutes refused to work, and plaintiff, being
ordered, pulled it out. The coal came upon him and injured him. Held, th,.t
although the plaintiff knew of the defect he did not as a matter of law assume
the risk from the defective chute. Sanborn, J., dissenting.
The present question is a close one. The facts are such as to show some
knowledge on the plaintiffs part of the defects in the chutes. That it was not
absolute enough to take it out of the jury is not altogether clear.
PROCESS-NoN-RESIDENT-ENTICING INTO STATE-OPPORTUNITY TO LEAVE.
-OLEAN ST. RY. Co. v. FAIRMOUNT CONS. Co., 67 N. Y. Supp. 165.- The
president of a foreign corporation went to New York at the invitation of a
creditor of the corporation to confer with the latter concerning a settlement of
a matter in dispute. On their first meeting the president expressed his inability
to settle the claim at the time. At this juncture a process-server stepped up
and served a summons on the president in the creditor's action on the claim.
Held, even in absence of evidence of fraudulent enticement, the service should
be set aside, as the creditor was bound to give the president a reasonable op-
portunity to leave the State after the termination of the conference.
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This case goes one step further than those which hold that, in absence ofcrime, the courts will not permit such an unfair and inequitable method to en-force a civil process. Snelling v. Watrous, 2 PAige, Ch. 14; Beacom v. Rogers,
79 Hun. 220.
PHYSICIANS-PRACTICIMG WITHOUT LICENSE -0STEOPATHY.-LITrTLE V.
STATE, 84 N. W. 248 (Neb.).-A man practiced osteopathy without complying
with a statute establishing a State Board of Health and prohibiting the prac-
tice of "medicine, surgery and obstetrics" without a license. Held, liable to
the penalty prescribed by the statute.
The practice of osteopathy consists principally in rubbing and kneading
portions of the bodies and manipulating the limbs of patients to remove the
cause or causes of disease. The Court, taking a broad view of the question at
issue, sought to carry out the legislative intent and effect the object of the stat-ute designed to protect the public. State v. Buswell, 58 N. W. 728,24 L. 1. A.69. The judges could see no reason why osteopathy should be distinguishedfrom "Christian Science" treatment, and accordingly followed 'astra v.
People, 71 111. App. 236.
STREET RAILROADS-REMOVAL OF OBSTRUCTIONS-SHADE TREES.-MILLER
v. DETROIT, Y. & A. A. RY. Co., 84 N. W. 49 (Mich.).-A street railway com-
pany, with the proper franchise to lay tracks, erect poles, etc., removed eleven
shade trees without notice or compensation to owner. Held, liable for
damages.
The Court followed the principle laid down in Wyantv. Telephone Co., 47
L. R. A. 497, viz: that a telephone company has the right to cut out the
branches of trees along the public highway. It held accordingly that, a street
railway not being an additional servitude, the company may remove all ob-
structions, including shade trees, without compensation to the owner. Wilsonv. Simmons, 36 At]. 380; Dodd v. Traction Co., 57 N.J. Law 482. However,
as the abutting owner has the title to shade trees adjoining his premises (Coo-
ley, Torts, 318, 372; People v. Foss, 80 Mich. 559), he must have notice toremove obstructing trees, and reasonable time, before the municipality or anycorporation may proceed to do so. Clark v. Dasso, 34 Mich. 86; Stretch v.Village of Cassopols, 84 N. W. 51. The defendant failed to give such notice
and was accordingly held liable for damages.
TELEPHONE COMPAxy-AcTIo FOR NoN-FEASANCE.--LEvIN ET AL V.
SOUTHWESTERN TELEGRAPH & TELEPHONE Co., 59 S. W. 303 (Tex.).-The
appellant was expecting an important message over the wires of the appellee
company, and was waiting in appellee's office to receive the same. The appel-
lant desired to leave the office for a short time, and left word where he might
be found. While he was absent, the message came. The appellee knew of the
importance of the message, but made no effort to get the appellant, in conse-
quence of which the latter suffered great pecuniary loss. Held, no action
would lie.
This case was decided as above on the ground that the appellee company
had in no way agreed to serve the appellant in any capacity, nor to do any-




UNFAIR COMPETITION-SMILARITY o NAmE.-ALLEN B. WRISLEY Co. v.
IOWA SOAP CO. ET AL, 104 Fed. 548.--Complainant had for many years sold
a soap called "Old Country Soap." Defendant made a soap named "Our
Country Soap." Held, mere similarity of names did not constitute unfair
competition.
It would be difficult to find two names that looked and sounded more
alike than those in the present case. Were it only a matter of similarity of
names, the case would seem to come under N. K. Fairbank v. Central Lard Co.,
64 Fed. 133, and the claim of the complainant be established. But the ques-
tion of similarity as to wrappers is considered of greater importance, and
there being no similarity in the wrappers the case is brought in line with Loril-
lard Co. v. Peter, 57 U. S. App. 565. It will be noted, however, that the
cases that have been based on dissimilarity of wrappers were ones where there
was also a dissimilarity of name. The'present case extends the scope
of such cases.
VARIANCE BETWEEN ALLEGATIONS IN THE INDICTMENT AND PROOF-WHAT
MATTER OF DESCRIPTION MAY BE REJECTED AS SURPLUSAGE.-BoYD v. Com-
mONWEALTE, 59 S. W. 518 (Ky.).-Under an indictment charging that a horse
stolen was "blemished on left eye," evidence that the stolen horse was blem-
ished on the right eye was held, not a fatal variance.
This case is supported by Cone v. Holland, 7 Ky. Law Rep. 299, but it is
hard to bring it within the common-law rule that where any matter of descrip-
tion is alleged, though unnecessarily, it cannot be rejected as surplusage, as
such matter of description goes to determine the identity of the Qffense. Horses
blind in a single eye, are not so rare but that a misdescription admits
of considerable uncertainty. This view is supported by Story, J., in United
States v. Howard Fed. Cases No. 15,403, where he says no allegation more or
less particularly descriptive of the identity of that which is essential to the
charge can be rejected as surplusage. In Allenbrech v. People, 1 Denis 80, a
charge of stealing one woolen sheet was not sustained by proof that it was
partly of wool and partly of cotton. So in stealing lumber, where the marks
alleged are other than those proved. State v. Noble, 15 Me. 476; Com. -7.
Wellington, 7.Allen 299. All these cases hold to the cardinal rule of criminal
pleading, that while a general description of the subject matter is sufficient,
yet if the pleader descends to particulars the proof must exactly coincide
with the allegations.
